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There’s a captivating photograph in the collection of the Bildarchiv Preußischer 
Kulturbesitz of the chemist Otto Hahn and the physicist Lise Meitner in their lab 
at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Chemistry in Berlin in 1913. Meitner looks 
on while Hahn records something with pen and paper. Behind them is a row of 
glass jars, neatly labelled. Many things are implicit in this image: the research 
partnership that would lead to the discovery of nuclear fission, Meitner’s ground-
breaking career and the belated recognition of her contributions to physics, as well 
as the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute itself, which sponsored their research, as it did the 
research at the Institute of Anthropology, Human Heredity and Eugenics, founded 
in 1927, which helped lay groundwork for some of the greatest horrors of the Nazi 
regime. But the bottles in the photo’s background are equally captivating. Pristine, 
carefully ordered and labelled, they suggest the impetus at the heart of all research 
—the desire to identify, categorize, classify, and name in order to understand. This 
taxonomic impulse, to distil things down to their core characteristics, or ‘essence,’ 
and then relate them to each other by classifying them in groups, resonates in 
revealing ways in the three edited collections under review. In all three books 
certain political taxonomies—the right, fascism, and liberalism and its antitheses 
—form the point of departure, and all three volumes probe and challenge the 
categories that have structured historical analyses of European politics of the mid-
twentieth century.
These three books appeared in 2014 and 2015 and share a further link with the 
1913 photograph: they emerged on the eve of world events that would make their 
research deeply relevant—the photo on the eve of the Great War, during which 
Hahn was recruited to work on chemical weapons and Meitner in radiology, and 
the books just before the tumultuous year from June 2016 to May 2017 that saw 
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Brexit and the election of Donald Trump in the United States, as well the historic 
second round of the French elections, in which no traditional parties of the left or 
right were represented. 
Each of these political events underscores the pressing need to understand the 
roots, causes, and various shades and constellations of populism, demagoguery, 
racism, xenophobia, misogyny, ultra-nationalism, isolationism, and conservatism 
that have launched a fresh assault on liberal democracy, the European project, 
and the international order. These are precisely the phenomena that Kalman and 
Kennedy, Jones, and Gosewinkel contour and deconstruct in the name of a more 
nuanced historical understanding of mid-twentieth-century Europe, but their 
work also offers valuable insights for the present. Indeed, in the current cultural 
and political climate of obfuscation and euphemism—of “alternative facts”—the 
kind of fine-grained work in these books and their emphasis on accuracy, clarity, 
subtlety, and nuance is now, more than ever, vital. 
***
As their titles suggest, Samuel Kalman and Sean Kennedy’s The French Right 
between the Wars, Larry Eugene Jones’s The German Right in the Weimar 
Republic, and Dieter Gosewinkel’s Anti-liberal Europe all treat European politics 
in the tempestuous period between 1918 and 1945, though Gosewinkel’s scope 
extends well into the Cold War. Kalman and Kennedy and Jones’s books deal 
exclusively with the political right (albeit in its broadest conception), while 
Gosewinkel’s lens makes room for communism and other anti-paliamentary or 
anti-democratic movements. In addition to mapping out the taxonomic terrain, 
these three collections ask a set of common, and crucial, questions: How is 
prejudice mobilized? How is violence normalized? And how and why are people 
induced to rally to movements that work against their own rights and freedoms?
Kalman and Kennedy’s explicit goal in The French Right between the Wars 
is to move beyond the so-called immunity thesis and the debates it has inspired 
in the historiography of the French interwar period. As the authors write in their 
introduction, “much of the relevant literature has focused heavily, though not solely, 
on the question of how the various components of the interwar Right should be 
labeled, a matter which in turn has profound implications for characterizing their 
significance” (Kalman & Kennedy, p.6). Labelling elements of the interwar right 
as nationalist, conservative, reactionary, or Bonapartist—rather than fascist—has 
allowed certain scholars to portray France as immune to the fascist temptation. 
Others, however, challenged the view that fascism held limited appeal in France 
either by redefining fascism or by demonstrating the connections between fascist 
and other movements. As seminal as these debates have been, Kalman and 
Kennedy’s collection brings new perspectives and an openness to paradox to the 
study of right-wing politics in interwar France. Without simplifying or minimizing 
earlier historiography—which they deftly mapped out in their introduction—they 
nevertheless see fertile terrain beyond these debates, and as a result their book’s 
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essays dissect not only the politics and ideas of the period, but also lived realities 
in all their messiness. 
Part I, about political movements, includes chapters on the psychology and 
anti-southern prejudices of the masses and how right-wing movements understood 
and mobilized these; the matrix of fascist, racist, and colonial violence in law 
enforcement in Algeria; ties between the French veterans’ movement and the 
extreme right; and an analysis of how some members and leaders of the Ligue 
des droits de l’homme slid from pacifism to collaboration with Nazi Germany. 
Part II, Gender and the Right, works to “move beyond the standard depiction of 
masculine-dominated movements” (Kalman & Kennedy, p.14) with articles that 
dismantle the idea of the right’s narrow misogyny. The ways in which right-wing 
movements mobilized women reveal a nuanced picture of their simultaneous 
exaltation and subjugation, as well as the militancy of right-wing women 
themselves. Part III, Intellectual and Cultural Trends, corrects the tendency of 
historians of the French interwar right to overlook the cultural realm. Chapters 
dealing with the mobilization of mass cultural production, religious associational 
life, the conservative press, and physical culture reveal how effectively the political 
agendas of movements on the right turned various cultural forms into “weapons of 
ideological and rhetorical combat” (Kalman & Kennedy, p. 16). Part IV takes the 
form of an epilogue by Bill Irvine, which highlights the inadequacies of a binary 
lens of ‘left’ and ‘right’ for French politics and ideology in this period: “[A]t any 
given moment in the seventy years of the [Third] Republic,” Irvine writes, “the 
above-listed taxonomy could do some considerable violence to political reality” 
(Kalman & Kennedy, p. 229).
Larry Eugene Jones’s The German Right in the Weimar Republic: Studies 
in the History of German Conservatism, Nationalism, and Antisemitism makes a 
similar call for “a more nuanced and differentiated approach to the study of the 
German Right” (Jones, p. 2). His aim, however, “is not so much to challenge the 
new master narrative on the history of the German Right in the Weimar Republic 
as to underpin it with examples of some of the most recent scholarly work” (Jones, 
p. 2). That new master narrative emphasizes the disunity and fragmentation of 
right-wing movements in Weimar Germany and holds that “disunity of the Right 
was every bit as important as a prerequisite for the establishment of the Third 
Reich as the schism on the socialist Left or the fragmentation of the political 
middle” (Jones, 2). In emphasizing the fractiousness of a political milieu that 
was often defined more by disposition than by doctrine, the book’s chapters aim 
to reassess the political and intellectual alignments and trajectories of the major 
figures and movements on the Weimar right. 
As a result, it concentrates on intellectual biographies of political elites and 
the dynamics of party and league politics, but also considers the role of religion, 
anti-semitism, and nationalism in the rhetoric and practice of the German right. 
Chapters on Hindenburg, on Count Kuno von Westarp, and on Carl Schmitt are 
exemplars of recent scholarly interest in the study of elites. The Pan-German 
League is likewise the focus of three chapters that explore academics’ role in 
defining the League’s exclusionary vision of the German people and nation; 
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the League’s post-1918 trajectory and ultimate eclipse by para-military combat 
leagues and the NSDAP (Nazi party); and the relationship between the League 
and the Nazi movement. A further three chapters investigate the nature and role 
of anti-semitism (particularly the opportunistic, situational variant) in the German 
National People’s Party, the Combat Leagues, and the Catholic right, respectively. 
In all these chapters, the question of taxonomy arises in various forms. A 
binary and adversarial worldview was fundamental to the German right, despite 
the multiplicity and heterogeneity of its movements. The conservative critic Carl 
Schmitt, whose influence is felt throughout the collection, “defined the friend-foe 
antagonism as the salient criterion of the political realm” (Jones, p. 39). But the 
issue of classification is also central to the chapters that reassess the intellectual 
and political alignment of right-wing elites and movements. The first chapter 
begins with the question, “How does one situate Hindenburg in the German 
Right?” The same question appears in other chapters about other elites, including 
Schmitt himself. It may appear that authors are simply moving Hindenburg or 
Schmitt from one jar to another, but as Wolfram Pyta argues, the answers to such 
questions transcend classification, as they help explain “the processes of political 
change that ran through the German Right” (Jones, p. 25).
One might wish, in a collection such as this, for an afterword or epilogue 
to tie the chapters together or perhaps point towards further research or other 
interpretive frameworks. Indeed, there is one additional chapter—on eugenics and 
Protestant social welfare—that offers one such new direction: how missionaries 
returning from former German colonies in East Africa viewed Weimar Germany, 
and how these perceptions further complicate our understanding of both German 
Protestant and colonial missionary perspectives on social welfare issues. Similarly, 
other scholarlship on militant conservative women in Germany, most notably by 
Raffael Scheck, whose work Jones mentions, suggests other fruitful perspectives.1 
Contrary to a lament in the introduction that English-language scholars have 
switched focus from Weimar intellectual, diplomatic, and political history to 
fields such as cultural studies and gender studies, it seems to this reviewer that the 
latters’ perspectives and methods could, in fact, greatly enhance the more nuanced 
understanding of the Weimar period that this book seeks. 
Dieter Gosewinkel’s Anti-liberal Europe: A Neglected Story of Europeani-
zation tackles the issue of political taxonomies head on. Rather than the binary left/
right divide, Gosewinkel proposes liberalism and anti-liberalism as an interpretive 
framework to help us make sense of twentieth-century Europeanization. 
Remarkably, however, the book opens by challenging the very conceptual validity 
of that idea (though not its scholarly or intellectual merit). Starting with the debate 
over definitions of ‘liberal’ and ‘anti-liberal,’ it then probes and dissects various 
“other” ideas of Europe. Gosewinkel’s contention is that, from our perspective 
today, the European project, essentially integration, appears as a profoundly liberal 
one based in political, economic, and personal freedoms. These days, challenging 
Europe generally means leaving it. But Gosewinkel and his contributors 
1 Raffael Scheck, Mothers of the Nation: Right-Wing Women in Weimar Germany (Oxford: Berg, 2004).
445
demonstrate that there have always been other, competing visions of Europe 
inspired by other, often anti-democratic, anti-capitalist, and anti-parliamentary, 
and therefore anti-liberal, ideas. These are the focus of the collection.
Part I, Concepts, deals with taxonomies—defining the intellectual terrain 
and its terms of reference. In the introduction, Gosewinkel emphasizes that “the 
abundant evidence of another strand of [European] development that deviates 
from the liberal tradition … and even contradicts it” demands further analysis 
(Gosewinkel, p. 7). In response, the first chapter, by Michael Freeden, questions 
the notion of anti-liberalism when liberalism itself is such a diverse and elusive 
concept. Freeden cautions us against ideal types and astutely suggests testing these 
ideas on “the vague borderlines that occasion difficult judgments” (Gosewinkel, p. 
42). Part II treats anti-liberalism as a feature of colonial and conservative concepts 
of Europe. From colonialism and the violence of decolonization as a barometer 
of Europe’s deep and abiding anti-liberalism, to projects such as ‘Abendland’ 
and ‘Europe of the Regions’ (which saw Europeanization through a hierarchical, 
Christian, organic reorganization of society as a solution to problems born of 
modernity, capitalism, and democracy) these chapters present alternate visions 
of Europe from without and within. Part III investigates the place of ‘ideas of 
Europe’ in the Nazi period and the German Democratic Republic. It addresses 
the Nazi ‘New European Order’ and Franco-German wartime collaboration as 
Europeanizing projects, as is the ‘Communist Europeanism’ of the East German 
state. An Afterword by Martin Conway probes the contours of liberal and anti-
liberal conceptions of Europe. “The role of historians,” Conway writes, “is to 
subvert teleologies of integration focused on the present day by exploring both the 
historical genealogy of contemporary ideas of Europe, and by locating the process 
of European (re-)construction that occurred across the second half of the twentieth 
century within a much larger undergrowth of projects, ideologies and dreams that 
failed to happen, or simply failed” (Gosewinkel, p. 179).
***
It is perhaps a historical cliché to describe mid-twentieth-century Europe as a 
laboratory, a tumultuous place fostering experimentation and reaction, with 
simmering crises leading to explosive events. Cliché notwithstanding, the Hahn/
Meitner laboratory came immediately to mind when I read these three collections, 
not least because of the tension between those pristine, orderly jars of distilled 
elements clearly labelled and the powerful, ugly, complicated nuclear age they 
would ultimately unleash. A similar tension is present in the scholarship we 
consider here: how can we historians simultaneously do justice to past realities 
by identifying and classifying ideas and movements with as much accuracy and 
clarity as we can, while still making room for the messy, unruly, unexpected ways 
in which they may defy or undermine our categories entirely? 
By probing the taxonomies of European politics—whether to stress the 
complexity and heterogeneity of the European right or to propose moving away 
from the categories of left and right altogether, either by seeking a new framework 
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in the concepts of liberalism and anti-liberalism or by challenging the fundamental 
viability of those concepts—the scholarship here is alive with these tensions, and 
the result is research that is critical, reflexive, open, and engaged, principles that 
have taken on an added significance in our contemporary world.
In his most recent book, The Latest Catastrophe: History, the Present, 
the Contemporary, French historian Henry Rousso argues that it is the duty of 
historians “to restore a genealogy, … to propose an order of intelligibility” to the 
study of contemporary events.2 The collections under review here give us some 
tools and frameworks to do just that. Indeed, the media and political observers 
have been turning to historians of interwar and Second World War Europe in an 
effort to try to make sense of the events of this staggering year. Timothy Snyder 
and Robert Paxton, for example, have been solicited to weigh in on questions 
such as whether Donald Trump is a fascist, or whether the United States is headed 
towards totalitarianism.3 The question of what label to affix to Trumpism reflects 
the same tendency that has preoccupied scholars of the French and German right. 
The trajectories of conservative elites in Weimar Germany who appear united 
more by disposition than by political doctrine likewise resonate. The inadequacy 
of the concepts of left and right to explain political alignments is nowhere 
clearer than in the showdown between Emmanuel Macron’s La République en 
Marche! and Marine Le Pen’s Front National. Finally, the equation of Europe 
with liberalism, and not solely integration, perhaps helps to explain contemporary 
rejections of the European project and the very idea of Europe from numerous 
points on the political spectrum. “Europe,” Martin Conway writes, “was never 
quite as modern as it appeared to be” (Gosewinkel, p. 186). Perhaps it still isn’t, 
and perhaps neither is the United States.
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2 Henry Rousso, The Latest Catastrophe: History, the Present, the Contemporary. Trans. Jane Marie Todd. 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2016), p. 156.
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